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Through a look at the writings of Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr and Yusuf Salman Yusuf, I 
argue that Iraq’s communists and Islamists during the middle of the twentieth century 
could not escape a common language, common circumstances and conditions which 
framed their conceptions of the relationship between their pasts, presents, and futures. 
Their political visions did not come from their disparate traditions, although couched in 
those terms, but from their common circumstances and struggles towards the 
establishment of a sovereign, independent Iraqi nation. Despite their disagreements or 
variously framed answers, they were guided by similar questions. Yusuf Salman Yusuf, 
also known as Fahd, presented his vision of the future within the communist tradition, 
which subscribed to the view that a progressive future is premised on a complete break 
with the past. Sadr posited a better future that would be undetached from the past and 
previous experiences, including the Shiite tradition. Both of their visions, as I will argue 
here, were shaped by the conditions of possibility and shared language of their present. 
While both Fahd and Sadr espoused a teleological view of history, the former secular and 
the latter theological, their political decisions and actions remained grounded in the 
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circumstances of their time and place, both of them primarily concerned with the fight 
against colonialism, the establishment of political sovereignty, and a developed future for 
their nation-state. Those actions were not fueled by their respective Marxist and Shiite 
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Scholarship on Iraq’s history during the middle of the twentieth century has 
insufficiently appreciated the relationship between older generations’ “problem spaces,” 
or a series of questions and answers upon which political stakes hang1, and the political 
visions of those generations. The answers or political visions that these groups advocated 
for as a means towards their hoped-for futures have been criticized in this scholarship 
from the vantage point of the questions which animate the problem space of the scholars 
as opposed to the questions which animated the time and space of the historical actors 
whose stories are being told. This failure to recall history in terms of a particular 
discursive context has resulted in a tendency to view the concerns of Iraqi communists 
and Islamists as unrelated or directed towards different ends. I argue, through a look at 
the writings of Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr and Yusuf Salman Yusuf, also known as Fahd, 
that these two groups in fact could not escape a common language, common 
circumstances and conditions which framed their conceptions of the relationship between 
their pasts, presents, and futures. Their political visions did not come from their disparate 
traditions, although couched in those terms, but from their common circumstances and 
struggles towards the establishment of a sovereign, independent Iraqi nation. Despite 
their disagreements or variously framed answers, they were guided by the same questions 
as they were located in the same problem space, questions which no longer frame 
political presents today. Fahd couched his vision of the future within the communist 
tradition, which subscribed to the view that a progressive future is premised on a 
                                                             
1 David Scott, Conscripts of Modernity: The Tragedy of Colonial Enlightenment (Durham: Duke 
University Press, 2004), 4. 
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complete break with the past. Sadr posited a better future that would be undetached from 
the past and previous experiences, including the Shiite tradition. Both of their visions, as 
I will argue here, were shaped by the conditions of possibility and shared language of 
their present. 
My approach is inspired by David Scott’s article, “The Temporality of 
Generations: Dialogue, Tradition, Criticism,” in which Scott reflects on a research project 
he conducted which investigated various dimensions of temporal experience: the ideas of 
generation, memory, tradition, and criticism. Through a series of interviews, he aimed to 
connect the lives of individuals to the emergence of a distinctive set of political concerns, 
or to underscore the events which animated the problem spaces in which their questions 
and concerns were developed. Through his own experience of the collapse of the projects 
of anti-imperialist self-determination, political sovereignty, and socialist transformation 
which made the Anglo-Creole Caribbean which his generation inherited, he recognized 
that he was unable to appreciate the ways in which older generations’ lives were 
connected to their political visions, or how they understood the relationship between their 
pasts, presents, and hoped-for futures. He thus sought to reconstruct the problem-spaces 
in which the project of anticolonial sovereignty, the building of a new nation-state, and 
the project of anticapitalist socialist change were developed.2 Similarly, by looking at the 
works of Sadr and Fahd, I seek to reconstruct the problem space in which the mid-
twentieth century Iraqi project of anticolonial sovereignty and building a new nation-state 
was formed. 
                                                             
2 David Scott, "The Temporality of Generations: Dialogue, Tradition, Criticism," New Literary 
History 45, no. 2 (2014): 157-9, accessed May 13, 2016, doi:10.1353/nlh.2014.0017. 
3 
 
 Significantly, in order to engage in historical criticism, Scott argues that we must 
be able to understand and establish a relationship with the ethos which animated the 
problem spaces of older generations. Scott turns to Karl Mannheim for a discussion of the 
way in which generations may be understood as a social institution of time, particularly 
Mannheim’s evocation of Wilhelm Dilthey’s concept of generations as institutions of 
temporalization which displace standard units of chronological time for a more 
meaningful understanding of lived time, as temporality is the content of experience. 
Dilthey is particularly interested in the coexistence and overlap of generations, which 
results in those who are cotemporal not necessarily being contemporaries. Those who are 
contemporaries constitute a generation as they have been impacted by the same formative 
experiences. Mannheim is interested in the sociological problem of generations, or the 
noncontemporaneity of generations, for what it can contribute to an understanding of the 
structure of social and intellectual movements, particularly in times of rapid political 
transformation.3 
 Mannheim describes the unity of a generation as location, which is different from 
that which unites social groups, both those based on biological affiliation and those which 
are self-consciously formed. Instead of biological or rational processes, generations are 
governed by shared historical experience which orients them towards a specific mode of 
thought and action. Scott takes the disconnect between the generation which experienced 
and participated in the making of political independence and those who inherited that 
legacy as an important aspect of the interviews he conducted. Mannheim also 
differentiates between generation units which are present within actual generations, with 
                                                             
3 Ibid., 161-4. 
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separate units understood as holding different political views. While belonging to the 
same generation, these units hold opposite intellectual and social responses to historical 
events.4 I propose that Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr and Yusuf Salman Yusuf can be 
understood in this sense, as sharing a location and thus being part of the same generation 
but belonging to separate generation units. This understanding of location and 
contemporaneity is useful for my purposes insofar as it allows for a recognition of 
commonality between the perspectives of Fahd and Sadr on the basis of their shared 
formative experiences. That commonality might be understood as a “distinctive structure 
of temporal feeling, a style that sets the tone of its moral and political sensibilities.”5 That 
temporal feeling for Fahd and Sadr was characterized by an anticipated horizon of 
political sovereignty. Further, the differentiation between generation units is useful for 
understanding that, despite that commonality, generations are not homogenous and the 
tendencies that a generation shares are realized in different ways by groups and 
individuals. Beyond that, these reflections allow for a better understanding of the shape 
and transmission of traditions and what that means for historical criticism and the 
relationship between question and answer in historical reflection. Through such a lens, 
we may better understand a generation’s way of living and experiencing the relationship 
between experience and expectation or past, present, and future.6 
 Scott reflects on one of the interviews he conducted and provides a tangible 
illustration of the ways in which his contemporary questions were not applicable to the 
generation he sought to understand. Scott’s assumptions about nationalism, formed by the 
                                                             
4 Ibid., 164-6. 
5 Ibid., 167. 
6 Ibid., 166. 
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ethos of his own generation, as a party-political issue or an ideological political contest 
between rivals, were disarmed by his interlocutor’s description of the anticipated “new 
Jamaica” which was an experience of possibility and an open future. Scott’s generational 
understanding of the nation as a dead-end, as a state, precluded the possibility of his 
experiencing Jamaica in terms of the horizon of possibility of his predecessors.7 Being 
able to see that horizon allows for criticism that moves beyond denunciation. Scott urges 
the critic not to assume sovereign distance from the space she engages with and instead to 
recognize how one’s own understanding of the connections between pasts, presents, and 
possible futures rests on former understandings of those connections by previous 
generations, despite disagreement. To accomplish that is to escape a problem of 
contemporary criticism which views the past as error in comparison to a more developed 
present. Rather than thinking of history as a series of progressive answers, it is useful to 
understand it as governed by shifting questions and changing problem spaces and 
recognizing the noncontemporaneity of overlapping generations and their moral-political 
visions.8 Criticism in this view, Scott proposes, is a mode of engagement in which a 
tradition is juggled with across overlapping generations.9 
I seek to highlight the ways in which the generation of intellectuals who are the 
subject of my study conceived of, fostered, and promoted the anti-colonial struggle for 
political sovereignty and the building of a new nation-state, or the problem space and the 
conditions of possibility from within which these intellectuals came to articulate and 
promote that project of progress and the anticipation of a different future. I will 
                                                             
7 Ibid., 168-9. 
8 Ibid., 171-3. 
9 Ibid., 177. 
6 
 
demonstrate how Iraqi communists and Islamists espoused notions of movement and 
change in their conceptions of their hoped-for futures, albeit with significant differences 
in their understandings of “progress.” In spite of those differences, they shared the 
political aspirations of ending British colonial power, achieving political sovereignty, and 
building a new Iraqi nation-state, shared conditions and a language of resistance and 
liberation that was available to them given the circumstances and events which marked 
them as a generation. I thus seek to locate similarities and highlight the contingencies of 
space, time, and generation which shaped these ideologies. 
The anticipated future of the new Iraqi nation-state has been explored by Sara 
Pursley in her dissertation “A Race Against Time: Governing Femininity and 
Reproducing the Future in Revolutionary Iraq, 1945-63,” where she explains that the 
majority of those who had a voice in Iraq’s public sphere championed progress 
represented by a future developed nation which would be educated, scientific, and 
industrialized.10 I make a similar argument here about the espousal of such a notion of 
progress by Fahd, Sadr, and the adherents of their political ideologies. In Pursley’s 
exploration of the 1959 Iraqi Law of Personal Status, she looks at how the text of the law 
constructed “progress” and “tradition” through a search for what notions of historical 
temporality were to be found in the text of the law and in the discourses of its supporters. 
Through this focus on visions of the national future, she uncovers how these visions 
shaped public debate over different forms of political mobilization. For Pursley, these 
examinations shed light on broad frameworks within which such contestation took 
                                                             
10 Sara Pursley, "A Race against Time: Governing Femininity and Reproducing the Future in 
Revolutionary Iraq, 1945-63" (PhD diss., The City University of New York, 2012), 6. 
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place.11 Similarly, by searching for notions of historical temporality and visions of the 
national future in the works of Fahd and Sadr, I seek to shed light on how such visions 
framed the debate over forms of political mobilization and political ideologies. Here, the 
problem space I explore can be understood as a space of common understanding and a 
common language within which contestation took place. 
 
Historical Development in the Works of Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr and Yusuf 
Salman Yusuf 
 
Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr was born in Baghdad in 1935 into a prominent, 
religious, politically active family. Upon completing his primary education in Baghdad, 
he moved to Najaf in 1946. Then in 1958, after completing further studies, he began to 
teach and became increasingly active in politics after the July Revolution, forming the 
anti-Communist Islami Party. Sadr was imprisoned several times due to his political 
opposition to the government and was eventually executed in April 1980 along with his 
sister Amina al-Sadr.12 Sadr wrote several books, his most famous being Iqtisaduna, or 
Our Economics, on Islamic economics. His book Falsafatuna, or Our Philosophy, which 
I explore below, was published in 1959 and was a critique of communism and dialectical 
materialism, arguing that they were too flawed to serve as a solution to societal 
problems.13 
                                                             
11 Ibid., 7. 
12 T.M. Aziz, “The Meaning of History: A Study of the Views of Muhammad Baqir Al-Sadr,” 
Islamic Studies 31, no. 02 (Summer 1992): 117, accessed February 02, 2016. 
13 T. M. Aziz, "The Role of Muhammad Baqir Al-Sadr in Shii Political Activism in Iraq from 
1958 to 1980," International Journal of Middle East Studies 25, no. 02 (May 1993): 209, 
accessed February 02, 2016, doi:10.1017/s0020743800058499. 
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Sadr played a significant role in the Shi’i community and attempted to politicize 
the religious establishment, which had been relatively apolitical since their 1920 revolt 
against the British. As communism grew and became a prominent political force in Iraq, 
the religious establishment was increasingly faced with antireligious sentiment as well as 
communist recruitment of people from religious families in the Shi’i holy cities of Najaf, 
Karbala, and Kadhimiyya. Further, the religious establishment was split between those 
who were politically active and those who maintained a distance from politics by 
focusing on more strictly religious matters. When Sadr was a young scholar, the former 
group organized the Jama’at al-‘Ulama in Najaf in order to push back against 
antireligious sentiment, particularly by challenging the Communists. As both Sadr’s 
father-in-law and brother held positions of leadership in this group, he was able to play a 
role himself. Sadr also became the head of the Da’wa party and determined its structure 
and teachings, including its aim of organizing Muslims to gain political power.14 
Yusuf Salman Yusuf, also known as Comrade Fahd or simply Fahd, was born in 
1901 and executed in 1949. He traveled to Moscow in 1935 to study Marxism-Leninism-
Stalinism at the Communist University of the Toilers of the East. He returned to Iraq in 
1938 and assumed leadership of the ICP.15 He was the secretary general of the party from 
1941 until his death.16 From 1940 to 1944, Fahd unified the party and gained public 
exposure as its leader, as the party as a whole took on a more public face. In 1944, he 
held the First Party Conference, or the National Charter Conference, in Baghdad, as the 
                                                             
14 Ibid., 208-9. 
15 Tareq Y. Ismael, The Rise and Fall of the Communist Party of Iraq (Cambridge: New York, 
2008), 20. 
16 Hanna Batatu, The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements of Iraq: A Study of 
Iraq's Old Landed and Commercial Classes and of Its Communists, Baʻthists, and Free Officers 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1978), 406. 
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British alliance with the Soviet Union at the time meant that communists in Iraq were 
given some flexibility. Fahd had also recently been inspired by the first congress of the 
Communist Party of Syria and Lebanon in 1944.17 Fahd was from Nasiriyyah but worked 
in Basra and, along with others in Basra formed the Nasiriyyah Communist circle in 
1928. Seeking the favor and trust of the laboring classes as well as an understanding of 
their plight, he worked as a clerk at the Basrah Electric Supply Authority, then as a 
mechanic, and then a miller and ice-seller.18 Fahd was first introduced to communism by 
Pyotr Vasili, an Assyrian who grew up in Georgia, moved to Iraq in 1922, and lived in 
both Basra and Nasiriyyah, amongst other cities, during his short stay in Iraq. It was in 
the Basra and Nasiriyyah circles that the Marxist intellectual tradition began to take shape 
in Iraq amongst about a dozen men. Initially, Hanna Batatu explains, they attacked 
religious authorities through a bourgeois-democratic Association of Liberals, or 
Jam’iyyat al-Ahrar, which declared allegiance to the bourgeois principles of “liberty, 
fraternity, and equality” and released a public program outlining its aims in a moderate 
tone which leaned more heavily towards the use of legal and parliamentary means rather 
than fighting the political order. But, Batatu explains, the association’s actual campaign 
deviated significantly from their public program, holding antireligious views and making 
more radical political pronouncements. The association failed to attract many followers 
or secure political achievements. Recognizing the ways in which an assault on religion 
served to hurt their platform and strengthen their adversaries, the ICP later decided not to 
                                                             
17 Tareq Y. Ismael, The Rise and Fall of the Communist Party of Iraq (Cambridge: New York, 
2008), 31. 
18 Hanna Batatu, The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements of Iraq: A Study of 
Iraq's Old Landed and Commercial Classes and of Its Communists, Baʻthists, and Free Officers 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1978), 412-3. 
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touch the subject of religion directly.19 After Fahd wrote the first proclamation in Iraq to 
bear the hammer and sickle in 1932 and posted it around Nasiriyyah, more proclamations 
began to appear and the Communist Manifesto was circulated in Arabic translation. As 
Bolshevism spread in the south, Communists in Baghdad were more confined to 
intellectual debates as opposed to practical revolutionary work, and interactions between 
the south and Baghdad were rare until 1933 when many of them came together around 
the boycott of the British-owned Baghdad Electric Light and Power Company.20 When 
Fahd returned from the Soviet Union in 1938, he played an important role in bridging the 
gap between theory and practice and applying Marxism to the Iraqi context.21 
I now turn to an examination of the political thought of Yusuf Salman Yusuf and 
particularly his views on the progressive steps towards revolution, followed by a look at 
Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr’s political philosophy and his treatment of dialectical 
materialism, evidence of his interaction with the ICP and their political thought. Yusuf 
Salman Yusuf’s essay “A Communist Party, Not a Democratic Socialist Party,” which 
was likely written around 1946 although the year is not specified, was written in response 
to a question posed by his comrades, and opens by saying that the answer to the question 
posed cannot be understood without reference to the writings of Marx, Engels, Lenin, 
Stalin, and those who follow the working class movement in its three stages. The First 
International, he explains, is representative of the first stage, when the movement takes 
on the role of understanding the issues at hand, spreading their ideas amongst workers of 
various countries, and recognizing the foundational issues of the working class and 
                                                             
19 Ibid., 404-9. 
20 Ibid., 428-30. 
21 Ibid., 448. 
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workers’ organizations. The Second International, he continues, represents the second 
stage, which sees the working class movement take on a peaceful, nonviolent role, 
mirroring that of the capitalist class; producing and spreading literature; and taking 
advantage of opportunities to strengthen the socialist movement and encourage its growth 
and development by putting pressure on bourgeois governments through parliament, law, 
and elections. Lastly, the Third International or The Communist International or 
Comintern is representative of the third stage during which the working class seizes 
power in its hands as capitalism enters its final stage and the revolution of the proletariat 
is enacted.  In order to progress through these stages, he explains, it is necessary for the 
proletariat class to form an organization which is prepared to execute this path, and to 
garner support amongst the working classes of the East and the West and amongst the 
colonized while being cognizant of the varied situations, environments, and 
circumstances of those peoples, as well as developing an understanding of the history and 
future of the movement.22 
Addressing the problem of the national bourgeoisie, an issue relating to the early 
stages of the process outlined above, Fahd explains that during the stage of the fight 
against imperialism, communist parties must be formed on a mass, centralized basis in 
order to fight for freedom from foreign interference.23 Although he highlights the role of 
communist parties in the struggle of the working class, his emphasis on remaining unified 
and eschewing division to fight a common enemy makes clear that he is advocating for 
collaboration with the national bourgeoisie, a stance which he couches in the traditional 
Marxist-Leninist approach of the early stages of revolution. 
                                                             
22 Yūsuf Salmān Yūsuf, Kitābāt Al-Rafīq Fahad (Baghdād: Al-Ṭarīq Al-Jadīd, 1976), 33-4. 
23 Ibid., 37. 
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This approach by Fahd demonstrates Johan Franzen’s argument that the ICP 
became a leftist nationalist party, and that their desired role in Iraqi politics became 
ambiguous as they shifted towards becoming an Iraqi political party.24 This highlights the 
need to approach understanding this problem space in its entirety, as it is clear that 
nationalism and political independence were at the core of this space and were common 
ideals across political factions. But while Franzen makes a significant point, it is also 
important to note that, as part of the Communist International, Fahd and the ICP were 
following policies dictated by the International and thus acted as a nationalist party which 
was more left-leaning than the democratic parties; this happened not only in Iraq, but also 
in other countries whose communist parties ascribed to the policies of the Communist 
International. 
While I do not seek to rigidly define the shared problems which concerned 
political actors of this problem space, it is necessary to recognize the factors which allow 
for such an appellation to describe the space. Monarchism, British presence, imperialism, 
and independence were common issues which linked various political ideologies and in 
relation to which futures were conceived. Sara Pursley explains that the four parties 
which made up the United National Front agreed on abolishing the monarchy, 
establishing political sovereignty, declaring a democratic republic, implementing land 
reform, working towards industrialization, and shaping a new type of citizen through 
legal and social reforms. This overlap existed in spite of their differences: the National 
Democratic Party (NDP) envisioned a liberal democratic national-sovereign space 
conducive to capitalist development, while the ICP and Arab nationalist parties both saw 
                                                             
24 Johan Franzén, Red Star over Iraq: Iraqi Communism before Saddam (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2011), 2. 
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the revolution as the first step towards an end which would be achieved in the long-term, 
socialism for the former and an Arab nation for the latter.25 Samira Haj similarly argues 
that nationhood was the focus of all opposition groups. The Ba’th, she explains, saw the 
Arab nation as the proper means to achieve social and economic change, while the NDP 
sought to free the national bourgeoisie from the control of the agrarian classes and 
imperialist powers, and the ICP highlighted class conflict but aligned with the Iraqi 
nationalists in practice.26 Further, she differentiates the ICP from the NDP in that the 
former placed emphasis on organizing the working class in unions and implementing the 
eight-hour workday, advancing women’s rights, and securing national rights for the 
Kurds.27 According to Franzen, the ICP was part and parcel of Iraqi nationalist politics, 
and their early members were drawn to it for its anti-imperialist stance more so than an 
understanding of or attraction to Marxist-Leninist ideology.28 Franzen’s conclusion here, 
though, insufficiently differentiates the ICP from other parties who called for an end to 
British rule in Iraq and fails to explain what may have attracted its members beyond that 
which was shared with pan-Arabists, Ba’athists, and others; thus the lines drawn by 
Pursley and Haj are significant. This particular discursive context is useful in 
understanding what prompted Fahd to explain the difference between a communist and a 
democratic socialist party and to make a point of differentiating and clarifying the views 
of the ICP. 
                                                             
25 Sara Pursley, "A Race against Time: Governing Femininity and Reproducing the Future in 
Revolutionary Iraq, 1945-63" (PhD diss., The City University of New York, 2012), 3-4. 
26 Samira Haj, The Making of Iraq, 1900-1963: Capital, Power, and Ideology (Albany, NY: State 
University of New York Press, 1997), 109. 
27 Ibid., 94. 
28 Johan Franzén, Red Star over Iraq: Iraqi Communism before Saddam (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2011), 39-42. 
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As explained by Franzen, communist parties working in a Third World colonial 
context faced the dilemma of the working class being a minority and not having reached 
the same level of development as the proletariat in Western countries. In communist 
theory, the national-democratic stage was seen as the first step of the revolution, one in 
which the national bourgeoisie could play a part as this stage required a unification of 
social forces to oppose imperialism, secure national peace and equal rights, and create the 
ideal conditions for class struggle. In the next phase, the social revolution, a shift would 
occur from national to class struggle, the struggle would become distinctly social, and 
tensions between the working class and the bourgeoisie would then surface. Franzen 
highlights the incompatibility of the term “national bourgeoisie” with the context of 
1940s Iraq, considering that the majority of the small industry which did exist was 
foreign-owned. Thus, it might be assumed that Iraqi communists were referring to the 
Sharifian-effendi elite who were involved in industry or traders who were involved in 
export, when they used the phrase. Or, rather than referring to an economic class, the 
national bourgeoisie was sometimes understood as reference to political parties such as 
the NDP or Istiqlal.29 Tariq Ismael similarly notes the limits of the ICP in the 1930s and 
1940s due to the lack of a substantial working class which, where it did exist, was 
predominantly within British-controlled industries; he also mentions the ICP’s inability to 
recruit the peasantry.30 
 The issue of the national bourgeoisie was directly linked to the issue of anti-
imperialism as the anti-imperial revolution could not be successful without the 
                                                             
29 Ibid., 42-3. 




participation of the national bourgeoisie, but such an alliance with them included a risk 
that they would gain power after the success of a revolution or would betray the 
proletariat. Lenin suggested that communists in the colonial world use any means 
possible to gain mass support and warned against resistance to the national bourgeoisie, 
although he emphasized that the proletarian movement should maintain its independence. 
At the Second Comintern Congress, Lenin’s view was countered by an Indian 
communist, M.N. Roy, who argued that alliances with nationalist leaders should be 
avoided in countries with a reformist nationalist movement as they would be bound to 
join the imperialists. In Iraq, the ICP formed an alliance with those they identified as the 
national bourgeoisie. Fahd described that bourgeoisie as fitting into two camps, one of 
which were the pro-British imperialists, or civil servants and ministers, and the other 
were the reformist patriots as well as those who had ties to the national industry and thus 
clashed with foreign companies. Fahd saw the possibility of an alliance with the latter 
group because their personal interests overlapped with the national interest. Managing 
this relationship, though, meant having a separate public and private program, the former 
for gaining mass support and the latter for achieving a communist society. Thus, Franzen 
explains, Fahd did not comment as frequently on the long-term goal but his traditional 
Marxist-Leninist views were still clear, particularly in his Hizb Shuyu’i, La Ishtirakiyyah 
Dimuqratiyyah, “A Communist Party, Not a Democratic Socialist Party,” mentioned 
above. In his mention of the preface to this text by Fahd’s aide Husayn Muhammad al-
Shabibi, Franzen states that al-Shabibi made clear that the party should always maintain 
awareness of their long-term revolutionary goal of achieving the dictatorship of the 
16 
 
proletariat and not distance themselves from it or take any steps that do not lead to it.31 I 
suggest that that lack of frequent comment on the long-term goal was not only due to a 
desire to gain mass support, but more importantly because that would not have been 
useful for the movement at that particular moment. Fahd and the ICP were instead 
interested in the immediate struggles they were faced with, primarily the fight against 
colonialism. Still, they espoused a future-oriented utopian ideal of socialist revolution. 
 The question of the national bourgeoisie may be better understood with further 
reference to the policies of the Comintern. In my quest to understand the conditions of 
possibility available to the ICP and to conceptualize the time and place which I explore 
here, I refer not only to the conditions on the ground in Iraq but also to the sources from 
which the Iraqi Communist Party shaped their policies and through which their language 
was developed. To that end, Soviet policy and, relatedly, the policies of the Comintern, 
significantly shaped ICP rhetoric and decisions. As described by Fernando Claudin, in his 
chapter on the policy of the Comintern in regards to national liberation movements, the 
Comintern was faced with the issue of liberationist struggles being characterized by a 
bourgeois leadership who, in their efforts to involve the working class movement in their 
anti-colonial struggles, also took on a major role in trade union organizations. Faced with 
this dilemma, two sets of theses were drafted at the Second Congress to determine a 
strategy. Lenin’s thesis prioritized the relationship between the Soviet state and liberation 
movements as well as that between the Comintern and those movements, while the other 
thesis by M.N. Roy, as mentioned above, prioritized the relationship between the 
Comintern and its class enemies. Thus, Lenin’s main concern was for Soviet Russia to be 
                                                             
31 Johan Franzén, Red Star over Iraq: Iraqi Communism before Saddam (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2011), 43-5. 
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able to have the allegiance of nations fighting imperialism and in order to achieve that he 
believed the Comintern must ally temporarily with bourgeois democrats in colonial 
countries. Roy, on the other hand, felt that the role of the Comintern was to struggle 
against the control of the poor and the workers by the bourgeois-democratic national 
movement. While Lenin recognized that the colonial revolution would be controlled by 
the bourgeoisie for a long period, he felt that the proletariat of the Soviet state and other 
advanced countries would lead the anti-imperialist struggle on a global scale.32 
This relied in part on Lenin’s assumption that the contradictory aims of the 
bourgeois-democratic national movement, namely national independence and capitalist 
development, and those of imperialism, were sufficiently divergent to ensure that an 
alliance between the bourgeois national movement and the Soviet state as well as the 
proletariat of advanced countries was possible. He also believed that the working classes 
of the colonies were too weak to play a prominent role in national liberation movements, 
and cast doubt on the possibility of proletarian parties forming in colonial countries.33 
The ICP followed this policy, in large part because Lenin’s assumptions did in fact apply 
to their situation in which the formation of a proletarian party was not possible and the 
national movement in their country shared the ICP goal of fighting imperialism. In 
accordance with this policy, they maintained that once independence was achieved, class 
struggle could be emphasized.  
Further, while the Fourth Congress was more critical of the national bourgeoisie, 
stating in its theses that the bourgeoisie disguised their democratic aspirations in order to 
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detract from the communists’ attempts at class organization,34 Haj explains that the 
subsequent rise of Stalin meant that the Soviet state would take precedence over the 
revolutionary actions of other countries, thus weakening the internationalism of the 
socialist revolution. Stalin institutionalized Lenin’s ideas about the democratic bourgeois 
nature of colonial revolutions, necessitating a stage of capitalist development prior to 
socialist revolution. Haj explains that this limited the ICP’s ability to act in accordance 
with the particularities of their local context and led to a disconnect between their long-
term theory and immediate practice.35 As the ICP failed to question Soviet leadership, 
they accepted the theory of revolution by stages and thus participated in anticolonial 
struggle as a step towards a national bourgeois revolution. But following Soviet 
leadership also meant that the ICP fluctuated in their positions on the Iraqi nation. For 
example, when the Soviet Union was fighting fascism in the 1940s in an alliance with 
Western democracies, the ICP supported their British colonizers as well as the Iraqi 
monarchy. Once the war ended, the ICP returned to its anti-imperialist and anti-regime 
stance. Moving progressively to the left at that time, Fahd and the party increasingly 
faced persecution.36 
Fahd justifies and situates the necessity of the first stage of the revolution through 
an analysis of the Bolshevik Party and a discussion of the tactics through which they 
were able to reach what he considers a higher form of organization or a later stage of 
development. He quotes Lenin explaining that when the proletariat is in a divisive fight 
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with the bourgeoisie over power, it is necessary to work with reformists as well as those 
communists who may display a tendency to lean towards the views of the reformists.37  
Based on all of the above, I argue that Fahd’s political vision, representative of 
the ICP’s position and direction under his leadership, was one which highlighted the 
goals of attaining political sovereignty and building a new nation-state. Although he 
outlines a traditional Marxist-Leninist approach to achieving the dictatorship of the 
proletariat, the political circumstances of his time were such that ICP practices only 
embodied the first stage of that process. Fahd makes clear that the ICP allied with 
nationalist, bourgeois parties in order to resist the dominant problems of their colonial 
situation. The broader ideology of a socialist utopia which they espoused, taken in its 
totality, was not and could not have been relevant to the conditions of their time. Thus, 
although their rhetoric was couched in Marxist terms, their immediate struggle was one 
shared across Iraq. The ICP stagist strategy which entailed first participating in the 
nationalist bourgeois revolution in many ways shaped their politics on the ground; in 
seeking alliances with nationalist forces in practice, they became, in effect, very similar 
to other Iraqi nationalist parties. In this sense, the ICP’s romantic utopian anticipation of 
a pre-determined socialist future governed by accelerated progressive time was 
disconnected from the reality of contingencies in their present and conditions of 
possibility. But although the ICP’s actions were governed by the same issues that 
governed the actions of other nationalist parties and other parties across the Iraqi political 
spectrum, its utopian vision was markedly different from those espoused by others. As 
mentioned above, while the ICP and Arab nationalist parties both anticipated anti-
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colonial revolution as the first step towards an end which would be achieved in the long-
term, that goal was socialism for the former and an Arab nation for the latter. For the 
NDP, that vision was of a liberal democratic national-sovereign space conducive to 
capitalist development.38 As was the case for the ICP, the aspirations of these parties did 
not have substantial practical implications for their actions on the ground, namely 
because of their utopian, forward-looking nature. 
The ultimate goal of the Bolshevik party, Fahd reiterates, was the fall of the 
bourgeoisie and the rise of the proletariat, and there is no communist party which exists 
but on that basis, a necessity of belonging to the Communist International. Marx, Engels, 
and Lenin, Fahd adds, made clear that the era of the dictatorship of the proletariat marks a 
transition from inhumane, barbaric, animal life to a society which treats people based on 
their wants and in which the history of man can begin.39 This future-oriented outlook is 
reflective of modern understandings of the future as a rupture or break from the past. The 
notion that history can only begin once a radical shift occurs from inhumane life to one 
governed by progress and development is a clear marker of that modern notion of the 
future. Again, I argue that this idea was necessarily disconnected from the problem space 
from which Fahd wrote. During that time and place, the ICP was not contending with the 
bourgeoisie but was in fact cooperating with them in their joint challenge to colonialism 
and in their immediate struggle towards the establishment of a sovereign Iraqi nation-
state. 
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Consistent with his argument for forming a national anti-imperialist front as the 
first step towards achieving the dictatorship of the proletariat, Fahd reflects on the nature 
of modern colonialism and imperialism and its links to economic oppression and the 
communist struggle. Modern colonialism, a common enemy which unites Arab people, 
he explains, is distinguishable by the following characteristics: first, an instance of 
colonialism in one country does not only represent the interests of one colonial power but 
of them all. Secondly, colonialism is first and foremost economic colonialism although it 
depends on oppressive political, military, and administrative power in order to exploit the 
resources of colonized countries and the efforts of its people, to destroy national 
industries, to impoverish the people, and to entrench the dependence of the nation on its 
colonizer. Third, that colonizing countries share the colonies and their markets amongst 
themselves, and each instance of this leads to a war for which the colonized people pay 
the price. Lastly, colonizing countries are organized and equipped with the latest means 
of repression and protected by military bases, efficient armies, and administrators.40 
Fahd identifies colonialism as an uncompromising enemy which represents global 
capitalism and whose interests are intertwined with those of financial institutions. It is 
incumbent upon the people who want their emancipation, he adds, including the 
vanguards of the popular classes, to confront and expel this oppressive enemy. Thus it is 
necessary that they organize themselves in a manner that facilitates effective resistance 
and attracts the majority of the people to join the fight. According to Fahd, the struggle 
against one global enemy demands unity and coordination between the struggles of all 
liberationist movements. The struggle against colonialism requires that those involved 
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develop a clear, national stance so that there is no room for its misrepresentation, a stance 
which depends on the popular masses in the struggle in order to be able to achieve 
societal progress. The strength required to struggle against colonialism can be fostered if 
the political, economic, and intellectual struggles are coordinated and the masses are 
gathered and trained, Fahd pronounces.41 
Above, we see Fahd equating the fight against colonialism with the fight against 
capitalist exploitation. He names colonialism as a common denominator for the struggle 
and highlights the use of military power and technology to oppress and impoverish. By 
highlighting the economic as the main feature of modern colonialism, Fahd is making 
explicit the manner in which an alliance with the national bourgeoisie against colonialism 
and imperialism will ultimately serve the needs of the communist revolution and facilitate 
the battle against economic exploitation. But, I argue, although he frames the struggle 
against colonialism and its necessary alliance with the nationalists in terms of the 
ultimate revolution of the proletariat, the conditions of the moment were such that the 
communist struggle could not be brought to bear. Through his use of the language of 
emancipation and liberation through resistance, it is evident that his central concern, as 
was that of his party and several other political parties across Iraq’s landscape in this 
problem space, was a national struggle against colonialism which sought political 
sovereignty and the establishment of the Iraqi nation-state. 
In his discussion of political struggle, Fahd argues that it is necessary to train the 
nation’s people in all forms of political struggle and prepare them for a critical fight with 
the enemy. The political struggle against the enemy, he continues, is an inevitable fight 
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which must be fought by all people who want emancipation and liberation, especially in 
the current age, that of national liberatory struggles against colonialism. The Arab 
peoples who want liberation cannot depend on an external force in order to rid 
themselves of colonialism, nor can they wait for the appropriate global conditions, thus 
allowing opportunities to escape them one after another, he says. He argues that several 
attacks were carried out by the colonialists against the Iraqi people which could have 
been responded to in kind, were it not for the people’s lack of experience in political 
struggle. This enabled the colonizing forces to enforce their political and economic 
control. Some nationalist leaders, Fahd explains, hold the view that the masses should be 
left to learn without the guidance of the nation’s conscious, organized leaders, thus 
stripping the people of their weapons and leaving them unarmed and unable to defend 
against attack, leaving them unable to attain freedom, national sovereignty, and 
prosperity.42 Here, again, we see evidence of Fahd and the ICP’s central concerns of 
national sovereignty and the battle against colonial forces. But unlike other political 
groups who sought to attain sovereignty through negotiations as opposed to building a 
mass movement, Fahd and the ICP distinguished themselves by addressing raising the 
consciousness of the masses as a first step towards building a national liberation 
movement. Thus, while Fahd cooperated with and depended on the nationalists, he 
remained critical of them and the limits of their tactics and structural weaknesses. 
Clarifying his position on collaboration with the national bourgeoisie as it relates 
to the Iraqi context specifically, Fahd engages in a discussion of the internal political 
situation. He laments the failures of the al-Pachichi government in implementing reforms, 
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and argues that one reason for this failure is that the opposition is split into two main 
factions. The first group is made up of pro-British Iraqis, or the reactionary bourgeoisie, 
who serve colonialism and imperialism as employees and ministers in the Iraqi 
government. The second group is itself divided into two groups, the first of which is 
made up of nationalists who argue for the necessity of reform, and the second of which is 
composed of the progressive bourgeoisie, or owners of goods who clash with foreign 
companies, fighting for their individual interests and the interests of their class, which 
happens to overlap with the national interest as they seek to protect national resources 
against the invasive capitalist market. The government thus did not respond to the 
demands of the opposition, according to Fahd, because the latter is not unified, does not 
have clear goals or an organized party, and does not demand the aid of the people for 
support of their struggle.43 Again, here, Fahd emphasizes the need to create a unified 
front with those he identified as the second group, or those members of the national 
bourgeoisie who are willing to participate in the struggle against imperialism because of 
the threat that the world market economy poses to national growth and progress, the 
immediate concern before them. While describing those allies as instrumental towards the 
ultimate, end goal of the proletarian revolution, that future goal did not in fact directly 
impact the ICP’s alliances, strategies, or interests on the ground. Instead, those alliances 
and decisions were opportunistic means to an end which ultimately backfired when, 
under the rule of Abd al-Karim Qasim, the ICP was unable to progress with their 
communist vision as their hands were tied by those alliances. But, significantly, by 
highlighting the weaknesses of the national bourgeoisie, Fahd is asserting the importance 
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of the ICP and the necessity of their support for the struggle for independence as the 
nationalists are not strong enough to carry it out on their own. 
In the spirit of creating that unified front, Fahd calls his comrades to a national 
duty to raise awareness amongst Iraqis of the colonizer’s attempts to secure their hold on 
Iraq, to divide the nation’s people, and to block the people’s attempts at reform. Fahd 
calls all the people of the nation to act quickly to organize themselves and garner strength 
amongst them to defeat the attempts of all who want to divide the people, all who want to 
retain their privileges at the expense of the nation’s democratic freedoms, and all those 
who want to stand against the people in their struggle towards “a free nation and a happy 
people.”44 
Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr’s Falsafatuna, or Our Philosophy, is an explication of 
the philosophical foundations of Islamic Shia thought, but it is also an engagement with 
the question of the materiality of the modern world, particularly through Sadr’s 
interaction with historical materialism on the one hand and liberal capitalism on the other, 
and his refutation of both through Islamic philosophy as an alternative. In it he critiques 
communism and dialectical materialism and argues that they cannot serve as an answer to 
societal problems because they are based on false assumptions.45 The basic premise of 
this work provides a clear example of one aspect of my argument, that Iraq’s communists 
and Islamists could not escape a common language and shared political concerns. In 
order to engage in his discursive context and debate the merits of his own philosophy, 
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Sadr familiarized himself deeply with the literature of his political adversaries and 
engaged them on the same series of questions with which they were concerned. 
In this work, Sadr engages in a discussion about development, change, and 
movement. He opens his chapter on movement with a quote by Joseph Stalin on 
dialectical materialism in relation to metaphysics, stating that the former school of 
thought holds that nature is in a state of constant change, movement, renewal and 
development, and that phenomena should always be viewed with such renewal and its 
counterpart, disintegration, in mind. Sadr follows this with a similar quote on movement 
by Friedrich Engels. He then claims that proponents of dialectics allege that they alone 
consider nature to be in a continuous state of movement and change and that the logic of 
metaphysics holds that nature is in a state of complete stasis, while Sadr argues that 
metaphysics does not in fact describe nature in a manner contrary to its reality of change 
and movement. Sadr goes on to argue that while dialectical materialism, and the 
dialectical laws of development, is considered a new and original argument, it in fact has 
precedent in other forms of thought. What is new, he continues, is its dialectical aspect, 
which he believes must be dissociated from it as its actual content, or the central aspects 
of its theory, is in harmony with metaphysical logic and does not necessitate the 
incorporation of dialectics. Thus Sadr sees no value in couching the dialectical laws of 
development in terms of dialectics, as the core of this school of thought has already been 
formulated through metaphysics, and he seeks to strip the dialectical laws of development 
of what he considers their contradictory framing within the dialectical tradition.46 
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Leading into his argument against the communist and materialist concept of 
revolution as dramatic and disruptive change, and his argument for slow change and 
evolution, Sadr adds that, as he claims is clear to all, faith in the presence of change in the 
natural world is a matter which does not require prior study of science and is not a subject 
of disagreement or debate, but that inquiry into what shape such change takes and the 
scope and depth of its reach is a meaningful pursuit. And, in the history of philosophy, he 
continues, one can see that this debate over the nature of change has played out. Sadr 
breaks down this debate as one between advocates of change as progression or a series of 
stages which culminate in the mind as the appearance of movement and those who see 
change as uninterrupted movement or motion. Sadr explains that some schools of Greek 
philosophy took up the former view, including Zeno of Elea who described movement as 
a series of successive stops or moments of stillness, whereas Aristotle advocated for the 
latter, that movement is continuous. Aristotle’s school, he continues, proved the existence 
of continuous movement, progress, and development in natural phenomena. The 
succession of distinct phenomena each occurring after the other, on the other hand, is not 
growth or movement but a general type of change. Sadr thus explains the philosophical 
definition or the metaphysical understanding of movement as the gradual actualization of 
something’s potentiality. In other words, motion is not the disintegration of one thing 
which makes room for the birth of something new. Because the shift from potential to 
actualization occurs at each stage of movement, movement always has two characteristics 
at each stage: it is real because it is the actualization of previous possibility, and it is also 
potentiality which will be exhausted at a later stage. Development thus always contains 
the actual and the potential, and movement proceeds as long as both are present. This 
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understanding of movement, Sadr adds, was misunderstood and misrepresented by 
dialectical materialism, which instead claimed that movement can only proceed through 
contradiction, a constant which runs through the core of all things.47 As I will explain 
further below, this understanding of potentiality and actuality reflects Sadr’s conception 
of the relationship between present and future, and his belief that the birth of the future 
does not entail the disintegration of the past and present. Instead, just as potentiality and 
actuality are co-present, past and present are coterminous. 
In order to counter materialist explanations of change, Sadr refers to Muslim 
thinkers who address the concept of change in order to locate his explanation of it in the 
Islamic tradition, as constant and gradual. By doing so, he is able to emphasize change 
not as a rupture from the past but as a process of movement which engages the past. Sadr 
addresses the role of Islamic philosophy and its place in this debate, particularly with 
reference to the Muslim philosopher Sadr al-Din al-Shirazi, who demonstrated that 
movement does not solely concern natural phenomena but that its presence in such 
phenomena is only one aspect of broader progress and development. Al-Shirazi clarified 
that the principle of movement in nature is one of the philosophical essentials of 
metaphysics. Further, Sadr adds, al-Shirazi explained the connection between the old and 
the new by countering the assumption of some metaphysicians that faith in the eternal 
creator necessitates, from a philosophical perspective, a belief in the old and eternal 
nature of the world, so that the effect mirrors its cause. Al-Shirazi solved this problem on 
the basis of the law of movement, with the view that the natural world is in a constant 
state of renewal and development, so the coming into being of the world on this basis was 
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an inevitable result of its nature of renewal, and not because of the stable and eternal 
nature of the cause or creator.48 
After these and other reflections, Sadr asks if dialectical materialism’s accusation 
against metaphysics, that the latter believes in the still and unchanging state of nature, is 
sound. This accusation, he argues, has no justification and amounts to nothing but 
dialectical materialism’s misunderstanding of the true meaning and nature of movement. 
So he asks what the difference is between the Islamic conception of movement and its 
general laws versus dialectical materialism’s understanding of movement. The difference 
between the two understandings, he explains, boils down to two essential points.49 
The first point is that the dialectical understanding of movement rests on the basis 
of contradiction and conflict between opposing forces, with this contradiction and 
conflict acting as a force which propels linear and progressive movement forward. To 
clarify this point, Sadr redraws the distinction between potential and actualization, and 
argues against the Marxist consideration of the two as an entity in conflict. Marxism, he 
writes, takes the relationship between these two forces to be a type of contradiction or a 
dialectical association, and holds that this conflict between opposites is what produces 
movement. Opposite this, Sadr explains, is the Islamic understanding of movement as a 
result of both potential and actualization; without either of these two elements, it is not 
possible for movement to occur.50 Through this argument about the nature of movement, 
Sadr rejects the ICP’s conception of the future as a complete break from the past. Rather 
than the future entailing a surpassing of the past, the actuality of the present is intimately 
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connected to the past as it is the realization of past potential. Past and future are not in 
conflict; rather, the future proceeds gradually from the past. 
Quoting Engels, Sadr rejects the understanding of movement as described by 
dialectical materialists on the basis of contradiction, and argues that movement cannot be 
described but in light of the principle of non-contradiction. Sadr questions whether 
movement which brings about change is possible when contradiction is a factor in that 
process of movement, for if it does not involve change and renewal then it is not 
movement but stillness and stability. Noting that Marxism does espouse a theory of 
renewal and change in movement, he pushes back on Marxists’ insistence that 
actualization of movement contains a dialectical relationship. The most basic analysis of 
movement, he argues, makes apparent that the contradictory or dialectical relationship 
between opposing forces is not possible and cannot be present for change to occur. 
Instead, movement shifts gradually from potential to realization and these forces are not 
in conflict at any stage. Sadr reiterates what he views as Marxism’s misunderstanding of 
movement and its resultant rejection of metaphysics and the principle of non-
contradiction. He contends that Marxists are not the first to make an argument of this 
kind as some metaphysical thinkers have made arguments about change and movement in 
the same vein, but the difference is that Marxism incorporated the dialectical aspect as a 
means to justify contradiction by highlighting its presence within movement.51 
As mentioned above, I suggest that this correlation between potential and 
actualization can be understood as the relationship between present and future. 
Understood in these terms, it becomes clear how Reinhart Koselleck’s explication of 
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modern understandings of the future as fundamentally new and different from the past52 
are apparent in the context of Sadr’s rejection of dialectical materialism based on its 
proposal that potentiality and actuality, or present and future, are in conflict. As was 
made clear in the discussion of Fahd’s writing above, the ICP’s ideology and political 
vision for the future posited that future as a break from the past. Contrary to that notion of 
the progress of time, Sadr views the present and future as necessarily intertwined, with 
the future building off of and growing out of the past, and not in any way in conflict with 
it. Despite that understanding of the contemporaneity of present and future, Sadr’s 
political philosophy maintains a forward-looking anticipation of a new future, although 
one that is not characterized by a definitive rejection of the past. 
Sadr then adds another element to his argument about the nature of movement. 
Having established the understanding that movement is not a conflict between 
contradictory elements but that it is a gradual move from potential to realization, he 
explains, we are able to recognize the impossibility of movement occurring on its own 
and without reason, and that development does not move from potential to actualization 
without the presence of an outside influence. There must be a reason for movement from 
potential to actualization, for possibility to become reality. Thus, internal conflict or 
contradiction is not sufficient to bring about movement. Sadr owes this necessity of an 
external force to what he calls a general law of movement, and explains that it is a quality 
of nature that movement happens in accordance with this law. Because there is no 
stability in the natural world according to this law, and all that exists is in motion, it is not 
possible to stop at the boundaries of an entity or dynamic in uncovering a reason for its 
                                                             




movement.53 While this displays Sadr’s recognition of the role of human action in 
movement from present to future, as well as his ultimate attribution of the nature of 
movement to God, he fails to understand the place of human agency through the 
proletariat as a significant influence on movement in the communist understanding of 
change. Sadr incorrectly assumes that because class struggle is understood as the driving 
force of historical development, that it thus lacks an agentive force. Sadr’s laws of 
movement will be further elucidated below in my look at T.M. Aziz’s exploration of 
Sadr’s philosophy of history. 
The second point Sadr makes about the difference between the two 
understandings of movement is that Marxists do not view movement simply in terms of 
its manifestation in nature but also in terms of human thought. In this view, as external 
material reality develops and grows, intellectual perceptions undergo the same laws of 
development and growth which apply to the natural world. In contrast to this, in Sadr’s 
view, the general law of movement is a natural law which governs the material world and 
does not extend to the realm of thought and knowledge, as knowledge cannot involve this 
type of development.54 But, as will become clear below, Sadr prescribes to a particular 
view of change in history and historical development, and thus moves beyond the scope 
of change in the natural world in his explorations of development. As will also become 
evident, this view reflects Koselleck’s notion that historical processes are governed by a 
certain temporality which is different from that found in nature, one which acts as a 
causal force in the unfolding of events and which contains different speeds of 
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acceleration.55 But again, Sadr’s critique of dialectical materialism incorrectly assumes it 
to be a theory of natural development. Marxism, too, draws a distinction between natural 
and historical development. 
Sadr summarizes three main attempts by Marxism to explain the dialectical nature 
of the movement of thought and knowledge, with the first being that thought and 
knowledge reflect reality and thus reflect its laws and movement. Thus, thoughts develop 
dialectically just as nature develops in the same manner, consistent with the law of 
motion, such that thoughts are in accordance with the reality which they are formulated 
about. In this view of dialectical logic, truth cannot be something which is fixed or 
complete but instead consists of growth and change in knowledge of the world. Sadr 
instead argues that, although it is clear that thought and knowledge reflect reality, it does 
not follow that the growth and movement of the former moves alongside that of the latter. 
This is so because nature is governed by fixed laws, including the law of motion, which 
proponents of dialectics themselves acknowledge. Faced with Sadr’s contention that 
those fixed laws logically must be reflected by fixed truths or knowledge, he says 
dialecticians are left with two routes by way of which they can reconcile with that logic. 
First, they may accept Sadr’s proposition; otherwise, they are forced to reconsider their 
belief in the law of motion.56 
Further, Sadr argues that the understanding of a thing is different from and cannot 
play the same role as the thing itself. He thus argues that the laws of objective reality, 
including that of motion, do not apply to thoughts and ideas. If ideas did reflect reality in 
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that way, they would never be true. Notions about external reality are fixed and different 
notions correspond to various stages of movement, and thoughts do not change and shift 
along with that moving reality. In Sadr’s view, knowledge does not develop dialectically 
in a manner that reflects reality; rather, knowledge of each stage of moving reality is 
fixed. Sadr argues that if Marxism’s aim in arguing for the dialectical development of 
thought is simply to explain that external reality must not be understood as frozen and 
motionless, then Marxism is in agreement with metaphysics and need not argue for the 
movement of thoughts and notions, but simply for successive fixed notions.57 
The second attempt by Marxism to explain the dialectical nature of the movement 
of thought and knowledge lies in their proposition that thought is a natural phenomenon 
and a superior form of matter and is thus governed by the laws which govern nature and 
progresses dialectically as does all that is found in nature. Acknowledging that this 
sounds similar to the first point, Sadr clarifies the distinction: while the first point 
represents thought as a reflection of its corresponding reality and thus moves along with 
that which it reflects, the second point describes thought as itself part of the natural world 
and thus subject to the dialectical law of movement in its own right and not simply due to 
its status as a reflection of reality. As the human is part of nature, the products of the 
human mind are as well. This explanation of thought and knowledge is materialist in its 
ascribing all the laws of nature, including that of motion, to thought, according to Sadr.58 
Sadr’s maintenance of this distinction between the natural world and the realm of 
thought and knowledge is related to his placing responsibility for historical change with 
thoughts as opposed to natural processes or material conditions, a point explained further 
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below in my discussion of the work of T.M. Aziz. Sadr argues that ideas shape history 
rather than simply reflecting material circumstances or themselves being part of the 
natural world. Sadr seems to suggest that the Marxist understanding of the dialectical 
nature of thought is a conflation of the material and metaphysical sides of the historical 
process. His maintenance of that distinction and his resultant argument that truths may 
only be fixed if they are not subject to the natural law of movement is a way to establish 
his argument for gradual change and a carrying over of past into present. If truths are 
fixed, change cannot entail a radical and complete break from the past. 
In Richard Lux’s dissertation, “Revolution and the Will to Change: Cosmology, 
Cognition, and the Mechanics of Transformation in the Thinking of Muhammad Hussein 
Fadlallah, Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr, and Mao Tse Tung,” the author includes an analysis 
of some aspects of Sadr’s Falsafatuna. In this analysis, he notes Sadr’s recognition of 
some degree of overlap between Islamic contentions and Marxist thought, and Lux 
concludes that it is in some instances difficult to find significant divergence between 
some of Sadr’s ideas and Marxist discourse.59 I propose that this is a manifestation of the 
shared language between communists and Islamists in the space from which Sadr wrote. 
But, Lux adds, despite that overlap, Sadr has a well-developed critique of dialectical 
materialism. 
Lux also offers an interesting discussion on Sadr’s Al-Sunnan al-Tarikhiyyah fi-l-
Qur’an, which presents a theory of history, mentioned above, which says that the 
universe was created on the basis of sunnan, or universal natural laws. Historical sunnan, 
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though, are a unique set of laws which are distinct from the others in that they involve 
human action which is directed towards an objective or goal. They signify a forward-
looking, teleological relationship with a future occurrence, Lux explains, and they direct 
history. Further, they must have a social impact by moving beyond the scope of one 
individual and affecting others in a society. What can be drawn from this, he continues, is 
that thoughts and actions are formulated based on an ideal or goal.60 
I suggest that Sadr’s vision of a new future can be discerned through his historical 
sunnan. Although, as I explained in regards to his theory of potentiality and actuality in 
movement, Sadr does not espouse a view of the future which posits it as a radical break 
from the past, we see here that he does understand historical progress as being steered by 
a future goal. Here, we see parallels with what Koselleck describes as modern 
understandings of progress and the future, as Sadr’s historical sunnan look forward into 
an unknown future, and he understands human thought and action to be based on a future 
end. Sadr claims that the Qur’anic explanation of history does not espouse theories of 
surrender to destiny or random chance, and thus it is imperative that people come to an 
understanding of the sunnan so that they are able to take action. In this sense, human 
successes and failures rely on their setting “objective conditions,” a phrase Lux relates to 
Marxist literature.61 But although this may appear to be a reflection of the modern, liberal 
understanding of rational, autonomous individuals who are able to determine their own 
futures and are unobstructed by circumstances or conditions of possibility, Sadr does not 
believe that man can determine his own future but instead argues for action and human 
agency as part of a community and as a collective, as one factor contributing to historical 
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change. Although Sadr emphasizes the importance of human thought and action in 
influencing the direction of history, he contends that naturalistic laws or patterns exist 
which cannot be altered by men. This will become clear below in my engagement with 
T.M. Aziz’s breakdown of Sadr’s three types of laws of history. 
T.M. Aziz’s “The Meaning of History: A Study of the Views of Muhammad 
Baqir al-Sadr,” presents Sadr’s views on the philosophy of history based on lectures that 
he delivered to his students in Najaf, as Aziz explains that Sadr made a significant effort 
to formulate a theory on the development of history, an effort which had not been made 
by a Muslim scholar since that of Ibn Khaldun. Sadr’s view of history is drawn from his 
Islamic beliefs as he believes that God has set forth a system through which all aspects of 
the historical process are linked and governed by rules and natural processes, but that 
process has both a material side and a metaphysical side. The causal progressions of 
physical forces also have a social impact although they occur independently, and the 
ultimate goal of the historical process is divine. Thus, while he acknowledges the Marxist 
belief that changes in modes of production affect social change, he believes that ideas are 
responsible for shaping history, while the historical process as a whole is ultimately 
shaped by God.62 
Aziz outlines Sadr’s sunnan or laws of history which direct the historical process, 
as explained above. These laws are of three types: voluntaristic, naturalistic, and 
deterministic. Voluntaristic laws relate to human agency and they function like physical 
laws of nature, only in that they are based on actions and consequences or cause and 
effect. Naturalistic laws consist of patterns which cannot be altered by the actions of men. 
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Although men commit social violations which deviate from these patterns, those 
violations can only last so long until God’s will prevails in the unfolding of history. 
Lastly, deterministic laws direct the movement of history towards its end goal and as 
such these laws determine the ultimate outcome of the historical process which will end 
with the coming of the Mahdi, the twelfth Imam, and the establishment of justice, 
regardless of what shifts occur by man’s volition through voluntaristic laws.63 Again, 
through this philosophy of historical development, Sadr leaves room for a new future 
directed by the actions and thoughts of man, although he does not espouse a secular 
teleological approach in which man is the ultimate arbiter of historical development. 
Further, Aziz explores Sadr’s three stages in the history of man: rearing, unity or 
solidarity, and dispersion or discord. The first stage is bounded by the creation of Adam 
and Eve and their descent to earth. During this stage, God gave man knowledge and free-
will, and imposed a system of reward and punishment, all to ensure man’s progress on 
earth. The stage of unity, according to Aziz, has parallels to the state of nature of Hobbes, 
Locke, and Rousseau. During this stage, according to Sadr, men lived in social harmony. 
Driven by his need to survive, man cooperated with others; as man is motivated by the 
natural instinct of self-love, he depends on others in order to care for himself and ensure 
his needs are met. Social units during this stage were void of any exploitation and man 
was guided by Divine knowledge, thus refraining from evil. Because the only threat to 
this social order was deviation from the way of life mandated by God, political leadership 
and agencies of social enforcement were not necessary. The third stage, that of discord, 
which will last until the arrival of the Mahdi, resulted from an increase in differences 
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between people. The increased complexity of life and human needs led to the uneven 
distribution of goods and exploitation of the weak. This oppression or social 
contradiction is the primary feature of this stage and takes various forms in different 
social systems.64 
Here, Aziz notes that Sadr’s social contradiction differs from Marx’s in that the 
latter owes it to the growth and shift in means of production or the economic environment 
whereas the former sees the origin of the contradiction within man rather than in external 
conditions or changes in the forces of production although he does attribute a rise in 
contradictions to changing economic conditions. Man, in Sadr’s view, is responsible for 
shaping his surroundings, including economic conditions and social relationships. The 
human mental faculty is what governs the forces of production and they do not develop 
naturally simply by way of a dialectical process. Working with the Marxist definition of 
production as that which precedes social relations, Sadr proposes that thought and 
language must have preceded production. Man’s deviation from God’s way led to social 
contradiction, class division, abuse of power, and a struggle between those who seek to 
maintain their power and those who desire revolt and change.65 This relates back to the 
point I made above regarding Sadr’s separation between thought and nature, and thus his 
recognition of the difference between natural time and historical time as well as his 
recognition of the role of man and his interactions with his environment in the unfolding 
of history. But again, this relies on a misunderstanding of dialectical materialism as a 
natural process as opposed to one that is acted upon by the proletariat and by the 
bourgeoisie who shape the means of production. 
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 Aziz then outlines Sadr’s three types of social ideals, which make the historical 
development of one society different from that of another, which Aziz refers to as Ideals. 
In the first type, the present condition shapes the future and stunts the progress of history 
as the future becomes only a replication of the past. Sadr suggests that a society may 
choose this path for two reasons: either that they are accustomed to their current way of 
life, or that an authoritarian regime has imposed maintenance of the status quo in order to 
ensure its own survival. Regardless of the impetus behind this type of Ideal, it necessarily 
results in the waste of a society’s resources and the society is bound to collapse.66 This 
demonstrates Sadr’s outlook towards a new future that is different from the past although 
not radically opposed to it, and the importance of collective human thought and action in 
moving towards that future. 
The second type of Ideal is that which contains a futuristic ambition and seeks 
development and progress for a nation or society, or a future that is better than and 
different from the present. Sadr argues that such an Ideal is necessarily short-sighted and 
will always fall short of achieving a utopia. Because there are limits to human reason, 
man is unable to fully perceive the end goal and the goal’s imperfections will eventually 
become apparent once it is realized. Despite such an Ideal’s ability to mobilize people to 
improve their material conditions, its capacity to induce growth and development is 
limited. Once the goal is achieved, growth is no longer possible and the Ideal becomes of 
the first type explained above. Sadr argues that this type of Ideal fails to properly grasp 
its lack of potential. With such an ideal, man rejects all that is related to his present and 
past in imagining his future. Sadr names the Enlightenment goals of freedom from 
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religious, economic, and political oppression and the movement’s resultant unjust and 
amoral capitalist democracies as an example of the failure of such an approach to the 
future. So the second type of Ideal, like the first, also results in the destruction of 
society.67 I suggest that while the first Ideal highlights the importance of political change 
for Sadr and his espousal of a new future, the second demonstrates his eschewal of 
utopian futures which seek a radical break from the present and are estranged from the 
historical realities of contingency and conditions of possibility. Instead, Sadr’s ideal is 
one which can be achieved through gradual change. 
I argue that Sadr’s recognition of the flaws of such a political vision or ideal 
which seeks a break from the past and a radically different future, and particularly his 
relating of that vision to the Enlightenment, is related to Reinhart Koselleck’s argument 
that progress is not natural or given but that it emerged out of the European experience of 
the Renaissance and the Enlightenment which posited accelerated time and progress as a 
break from the past. In his Futures Past, Koselleck traces the origins of the use of the 
concept of “progress” and its being situated in opposition to “decline.” Progress, he 
explains, is a modern category which was not available prior to the end of the eighteenth 
century. He demonstrates how this new concept of progress as a break from the past and 
as change or accelerated time was naturalized. The future, in this new configuration of 
progress, would be both different from and better than the past, and could not be deduced 
from experience. This notion of the future also defined its opposite, decline, as that which 
is traditional and unchanging. In this sense, progress was a way to ensure the separation 
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of the future from past and present.68 By rejecting such a notion of progress and relating 
the future to the present and the past, Sadr pushes back on the modern concept of 
progress as a divergence between the “space of experience” and the “horizon of 
expectation.” Although the future would be better than the past according to Sadr, as is 
made clear by his rejection of the first type of Ideal which entails stagnation and 
maintenance of the status quo, complete rupture is also to be eschewed, an argument he 
makes against the second type of Ideal. 
Further, Koselleck’s ideas demonstrate the tension between Sadr’s theological 
teleology and Fahd’s secular Marxist teleology, and is helpful in allowing us to 
understand how both espouse a utopian ideal but each of a different nature. Koselleck 
explains that the European Enlightenment posited the idea that man can control nature 
and his environment through reason and that scientific knowledge and reasoning will 
allow man to achieve perfection. The Day of Judgment was replaced by a utopian illusion 
of the perfection of man through reason and pre-modern theological teleology was thus 
secularized. Dialectical materialism can be understood as one manifestation of that 
secular teleology. Thus, both Fahd and Sadr uphold a teleological view of historical 
development, but one secular and the other theological, respectively. 
Lastly, the third type of Ideal, or God, is that which Sadr deems the real one. 
Religion is the means through which man moves towards God and progresses. Regardless 
of the Ideals which societies and nations adopt, all mankind is part of a historical process 
which is directed towards God. Thus, because all are progressing towards God, Sadr 
contends that it may be done either responsibly, by submitting to and worshipping God, 
                                                             




or irresponsibly, by adopting an Ideal that is not God and thus remaining ignorant of the 
inevitability of historical development. Responsible progress places no limits on the 
development of man and would end the social contradictions that stem from man and all 
forms of oppression. Thus, according to Sadr, religion is the only Ideal which allows for 




Fahd’s political vision focused on anti-colonial liberation, obtaining political 
sovereignty, and building a new Iraqi nation-state. Although he espoused a traditional 
Marxist-Leninist approach to achieving the dictatorship of the proletariat as a long-term, 
future-oriented goal which sought a rupture with the past, the political circumstances of 
his time were such that the political activities of the ICP only fell within the realm of the 
first stage of that process. Following Soviet leadership and direction, the ICP allied with 
nationalist, bourgeois parties in order to form a unified national front to deal with the 
pressing issues of their time. The broader ideology of a socialist utopia which they 
espoused, taken in its totality, was not and could not have been relevant to their 
conditions. Thus, although their rhetoric was couched in Marxist terms, their struggle was 
one shared amongst Iraqis of various political factions. 
Similarly, Sadr’s espoused Ideal and his grand vision of the historical process 
could not come to bear directly on his political activity when considered practically in 
terms of the conditions of his time and place and the concrete circumstances he faced. 
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Instead, he rejected both the first and second types of Ideals by being an active 
participant in the political fight against colonialism and for political sovereignty and 
emphasizing the important role of man in historical development but avoiding a utopian 
vision which would fail to recognize its own limits and the contingencies which would 
obstruct its ultimate realization. In his refutation of dialectical materialism, he drew from 
the Shiite intellectual tradition only to engage with a common language of his time and 
place regarding the nature of historical change and the relationship between past, present, 
and future. He argued against the materialist concept of revolution as abrupt change and 
instead argued for gradual change and saw no conflict between present and future. 
Contrary to Fahd’s vision of the future as a break from the past, Sadr saw the future 
building off of the past. But despite that understanding of the role of the past, Sadr also 
anticipated a new future, as displayed by his historical sunnan. 
While both Fahd and Sadr espoused a teleological view of history, the former 
secular and the latter theological, their political decisions and actions remained grounded 
in the circumstances of their time and place as well as the common language of their 
present, both of them primarily concerned with the fight against colonialism, the 
establishment of political sovereignty, and a developed future for their nation-state. 
Those actions were not fueled by their respective Marxist and Shiite traditions but from 
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Scott, David. Conscripts of Modernity: The Tragedy of Colonial Enlightenment. Durham: 
Duke University Press, 2004. 
46 
 
Scott, David. "The Temporality of Generations: Dialogue, Tradition, Criticism." New 
Literary History 45, no. 2 (2014): 157-81. Accessed May 13, 2016. 
doi:10.1353/nlh.2014.0017. 
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